WHO SUCCESSFULLY REDUCED THEIR NATIONAL DEBT?

Argentina ยท Greece ยท Ireland ยท Germany ยท What They Did ยท What the UK Can Learn
โˆ’63pp
Greece Debt/GDP Fall 2020-25
First in 123yrs
Argentina Surplus 2024
32.9%
Ireland Debt/GDP 2025
4.9%
Greece Primary Surplus 2025
95.9%
UK Debt/GDP Now
25+ yrs
Since UK Last Had Surplus

Most countries talk about reducing their debt. Very few actually do it. But some have โ€” dramatically and against the odds. Argentina eliminated a 123-year deficit in one year. Greece cut its debt ratio by over 63 percentage points in five years. Ireland went from bailout to one of the lowest debt ratios in Europe. This page looks at how they did it, what it cost, and what lessons โ€” if any โ€” the UK might draw.

๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿ‡ท
ARGENTINA โ€” THE CHAINSAW APPROACH
Javier Milei ยท December 2023 to present ยท Shock therapy
1st surplus
in 123 years
292%
Inflation Peak Apr 2024
39%
Inflation by End 2024
1.8%
Primary Surplus 2024
1.4%
Primary Surplus 2025
4.4%
GDP Growth 2025
32%
Still in Poverty 2025

When Javier Milei โ€” a libertarian economist who kept five cloned dogs and described himself as an anarchocapitalist โ€” took office in December 2023, Argentina was a case study in fiscal catastrophe. Inflation was running at over 200% annually. The government had not run a surplus in 14 years. Poverty was rising. The peso was collapsing.

Milei's prescription was radical: an immediate 54% devaluation of the peso, a 4.5% of GDP cut in government spending, elimination of subsidies for energy and transport, dissolution of several government ministries, and a freeze on public works. He called it "la motosierra" โ€” the chainsaw. The IMF, which had been bailing out Argentina for years, was sceptical.

The results were genuinely dramatic. Argentina recorded a primary fiscal surplus of 1.8% of GDP in 2024 โ€” the first in 14 years, and by some measures the first full fiscal surplus in 123 years. In 2025, the surplus continued at 1.4% of GDP, even as Milei cut taxes. Inflation fell from 292% at its peak in April 2024 to 39% by end-2024 and continued falling. GDP, after a sharp recession in early 2024, grew 4.4% in 2025. The poverty rate, which spiked to 52.9% in mid-2024, fell back to 32% by mid-2025.

The IMF, which had originally lent Argentina $20bn as part of its stabilisation programme, upgraded its assessment significantly. President Milei won the October 2025 midterm elections with 41% of the vote and doubled his congressional representation โ€” suggesting the population endorsed the reform programme despite its initial pain.

โš ๏ธ The honest caveats: Argentina's situation was so extreme โ€” hyperinflation, 14 years of deficits, repeated defaults โ€” that almost any change was likely to improve things. The surplus was partly achieved through delays in paying provinces, adjusting pensioner benefits, and deferring debt obligations โ€” which the GIS Reports described as "cyclical rather than structural" changes. A September 2025 currency run that required emergency US intervention ($20bn bailout) showed fragility remains. Over 32% of Argentines are still in poverty. The structural reforms needed for permanent balance are still incomplete.
โœ… What it shows: Radical fiscal consolidation can work quickly. The belief that deficits are structurally permanent โ€” that it is impossible to balance the books โ€” was wrong. Argentina is proof. The cost was enormous short-term pain. Whether that was worth it, and whether it lasts, remains contested.
๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ท
GREECE โ€” THE SLOWEST PATIENT RECOVERY
From 209% debt/GDP in 2020 to 146% in 2025 ยท 63 percentage points in five years
โˆ’63pp
Debt/GDP 2020-25
209%
Debt/GDP 2020
146%
Debt/GDP 2025
4.9%
Primary Surplus 2025
2.1%
GDP Growth 2025
โˆ’8pp
Debt Fall in 2025 alone
3rd year
Consecutive Surplus

Greece's debt crisis in 2010-2012 was the worst financial collapse of any developed country in modern history. At its peak in 2020, Greek government debt stood at 209.4% of GDP โ€” more than twice the size of its economy. The country had gone through three EU-IMF bailouts, severe austerity programmes that cut public services to the bone, and a restructuring of privately-held debt (the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history at the time).

The recovery since then has been one of the most remarkable fiscal turnarounds in European history. By 2025, Greek debt had fallen to 146.1% โ€” a reduction of over 63 percentage points in five years. According to Alpha Bank analysis, Greece was the only eurozone country to achieve this scale of reduction, and alongside Ireland and Cyprus, one of only a handful to actually reduce its nominal debt outstanding during 2024-2025.

How did it happen? Three main mechanisms: First, Greece has run primary budget surpluses โ€” spending less than it collects in taxes before debt interest โ€” for three consecutive years, with the 2025 surplus reaching 4.9% of GDP. Second, GDP growth has been consistently above the eurozone average, driven by tourism, real estate, shipping and rising employment, which reduces the debt ratio by expanding the denominator. Third, structural improvements in tax collection โ€” reduced evasion and increased digital payments โ€” boosted revenues significantly.

The OBR projects Greece's debt will continue falling to 136.8% by 2026 and 130.3% by 2027. Greece is now cited by European institutions as the model for fiscal recovery โ€” a remarkable reversal from being the continent's fiscal basket case fifteen years ago.

โš ๏ธ The cost: Greece paid an enormous price for this recovery. A decade of severe austerity caused GDP to fall by 25%, unemployment peaked at 27%, a generation emigrated to find work, and public services were severely damaged. The recovery was painful and slow โ€” it took 15 years. Greece's debt, at 146% of GDP, is still the highest in the eurozone.
โœ… What it shows: Even the most extreme debt position can be turned around with consistent primary surpluses and growth. But it requires political continuity, external support (the EU restructured Greece's bailout loans to very long maturities at very low rates โ€” critical to making the numbers work), and a long time horizon that politicians find difficult to maintain.
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ช
IRELAND โ€” FROM BAILOUT TO LOWEST DEBT IN EUROPE
2010 bailout โ†’ 32.9% debt/GDP by 2025 ยท Ireland now runs a surplus
32.9%
Debt/GDP 2025
123%
Debt/GDP 2013 Peak
32.9%
Debt/GDP 2025
1.8%
Budget Surplus 2025
โˆ’5.4pp
Debt Fall in 2025
~4%
GDP Growth 2025
21%
Corp Tax % Revenue

Ireland's banking crisis in 2010 forced it to accept a โ‚ฌ67.5bn EU-IMF bailout โ€” one of the largest relative to GDP in history. The country was effectively bankrupt, having guaranteed its entire banking system. Debt peaked at around 123% of GDP in 2013.

By 2025, Irish government debt was 32.9% of GDP โ€” among the lowest in the EU and dramatically below its peak. Ireland has gone from bailout recipient to one of Europe's fiscally strongest economies in just over a decade. In 2025 it ran a budget surplus of 1.8% of GDP.

Three factors explain this remarkable transformation. First, Ireland maintained fiscal discipline through austerity in the early 2010s โ€” cutting spending and raising taxes, which was politically painful but sustained. Second, GDP growth has been exceptionally strong โ€” Ireland has consistently grown faster than the eurozone average, helped by its position as a European hub for US multinationals. Third, and most controversially, Ireland's 12.5% corporation tax rate has attracted enormous inflows of corporate tax revenue from multinationals including Apple, Google, Meta and Pfizer. Corporation tax now represents about 21% of Ireland's total revenue โ€” an extraordinary concentration that creates significant vulnerability.

โš ๏ธ The Irish model has a warning attached: Ireland's fiscal strength depends heavily on corporation tax revenues that could evaporate quickly. The OECD's global minimum tax of 15% has already begun to erode Ireland's competitive advantage. Several economists have warned that Ireland's headline debt figures understate its vulnerability because the corporate tax flows are volatile and could be relocated at relatively short notice. Ireland has acknowledged this by setting aside windfall corporate tax revenues in a sovereign wealth fund rather than spending them.
โœ… What it shows: A small open economy with a clear competitive advantage and a willingness to maintain fiscal discipline can recover from even a severe debt crisis relatively quickly. But Ireland's model is not easily replicable โ€” most countries cannot attract a disproportionate share of multinational profits through low corporate tax.
๐Ÿ‡ฉ๐Ÿ‡ช
GERMANY โ€” THE DEBT BRAKE MODEL
Constitutional spending limit ยท Only G7 country with genuinely declining debt
0.35%
Max structural deficit

Germany's approach to debt reduction is the most structural of any major economy. In 2009, Germany embedded a "Schuldenbremse" (debt brake) directly into its constitution, limiting the federal structural deficit to 0.35% of GDP and completely prohibiting deficits at state level.

The result over the following decade was a remarkable period of fiscal consolidation โ€” Germany ran a balanced budget or surplus every year from 2012 to 2019, the only G7 country to do so. By 2019, federal government debt had fallen to around 59% of GDP from 82% in 2010. Germany became the only large economy to genuinely reduce its debt ratio through disciplined fiscal policy rather than GDP growth alone.

Covid broke the debt brake (it has an escape clause for exceptional circumstances), and Germany's debt rose again to around 66-68% of GDP. But it remains far below most European peers. In 2025, however, Germany suspended the debt brake again to finance a major defence and infrastructure investment package โ€” a political decision that illustrated the limits of constitutional fiscal rules when governments decide to override them.

๐Ÿ“‹ The UK context: Germany's debt brake is the kind of structural rule the UK does not have. The UK's fiscal rules are set by the government itself and can be changed โ€” as they have been repeatedly. A constitutionally-embedded fiscal constraint is politically impossible in the UK system without a written constitution, but the principle โ€” making it legally harder to run deficits โ€” is one some economists advocate.
DEBT/GDP COMPARISON โ€” SUCCESS STORIES vs UK

Note: Ireland's GDP figures are distorted by multinational balance sheets โ€” modified GNI (GNI*) gives a more accurate picture of the domestic economy, at roughly double these headline figures. Sources: Eurostat, IMF, ONS.

WHAT CAN THE UK LEARN?

The UK's position โ€” debt at 95% of GDP, rising to 96% before barely falling โ€” is far more manageable than Argentina's hyperinflationary crisis or Greece's 209% peak. But the OBR's own projections show debt reaching 275% by the 2070s without structural reform. The case studies above suggest several lessons:

๐Ÿ“Š
Primary Surpluses Matter
Greece's 4.9% primary surplus in 2025 is what's driving its debt reduction. The UK has not run a primary surplus for over 25 years. Without one, debt can only fall if GDP grows faster than the debt interest rate.
๐Ÿ“ˆ
Growth Is the Easiest Route
Ireland's debt fell partly because its economy grew so fast the denominator (GDP) expanded rapidly. The UK's 1.1% forecast growth is too slow to meaningfully reduce a 95% debt ratio through growth alone.
โฑ๏ธ
It Takes Time
Greece's 63-point improvement took five years and followed a decade of painful adjustment. Ireland's recovery took 12 years. Argentina's is incomplete. There are no quick fixes.
๐Ÿ›๏ธ
Political Will Is The Constraint
Every success story required sustained political commitment across multiple parliaments. The UK has changed fiscal rules with every change of government. Credibility requires consistency that is hard to maintain democratically.
๐Ÿ’ธ
External Help Matters
Greece's recovery was only possible because the EU restructured its bailout loans to very long maturities at near-zero interest rates โ€” effectively debt relief. The UK, as a sovereign currency issuer, is in a different position but has no equivalent backstop.
โš ๏ธ
The Social Cost Is Real
Every country that successfully reduced debt paid a significant social price. Argentina saw poverty spike to 52.9%. Greece lost 25% of GDP and a generation emigrated. Ireland imposed austerity for years. There is no painless route.

๐Ÿ‡ฌ๐Ÿ‡ง THE UK'S POSITION โ€” HONEST ASSESSMENT

The UK is not in the same position as Argentina was (hyperinflation, currency collapse, 14-year deficit) or Greece was (209% debt, bailout dependency, complete loss of market access). It is a large, diverse economy with its own currency, deep financial markets and long debt maturities. These are significant structural advantages.

But the OBR's own analysis is clear: debt is not falling, borrowing remains elevated, and without structural change the long-term trajectory is unsustainable. The government's fiscal headroom against its own rules is thin. Early 2026/27 borrowing is already running above forecast.

The case studies suggest that reduction is possible but requires either: (a) sustained primary surpluses โ€” spending less than you collect before debt interest; (b) faster economic growth than the UK is currently achieving; or (c) both simultaneously. The UK's recent history has delivered neither consistently.

๐Ÿšจ NIESR's assessment of the Spring 2026 forecast: "The public debt position remains fundamentally unsustainable and a serious medium-term plan to bring debt down as a share of the economy will be needed." The cases above show that such plans can work โ€” but they require political courage and consistency that has been difficult to sustain across UK governments.
Sources: Alpha Bank analysis on Greece debt reduction (May 2026) via tovima.com; Eurostat Government Finance Statistics (June 2026); Buenos Aires Times "Argentina posted fiscal surplus in 2025" (January 2026); Global Finance Magazine "Milei Ends Argentina's Deficit After 123 Years" (January 2025); Focus Economics "Argentina's Economy Outlook Under Milei" (December 2025); GIS Reports "Javier Milei's economic policy in Argentina" (October 2025); The Common Sense "Milei's Economic Gamble Delivers Results" (June 2026); Visual Capitalist "Mapped: European Union Debt-to-GDP by Country" (October 2025); NIESR "Standing Still on Debt as Risks Mount" (March 2026); OBR Economic and Fiscal Outlook March 2026. Ireland GDP distortion: CSO Ireland Modified Gross National Income (GNI*) documentation.
โš ๏ธ Independent analysis. Not financial advice. Disclaimer ยท Privacy