Immigration is one of the most politically charged topics in British public life — and one where the gap between public perception and official data is especially wide. This page presents the numbers from official sources without a political agenda: who is coming, who is leaving, why net migration figures are used, what asylum seekers cost the taxpayer, and what the economic evidence shows about the contribution of those who work here. The data contains arguments for multiple political positions — we present it all.
The Headline Numbers — 813,000 In, 642,000 Out
The most recent ONS figures cover the year ending December 2025. The headline net migration figure of 171,000 conceals significant flows in both directions.
This represents a dramatic reversal from the record levels of 2022-2023. Net migration peaked at a historical record of 906,000 in the year to June 2023 — and has since contracted by over 77%. The fall is driven primarily by a sharp drop in non-EU immigration — particularly study visas and care worker visas — following policy tightening under both the outgoing Conservative and incoming Labour governments.
Who is coming: Non-EU nationals account for the majority of immigration — primarily from India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Zimbabwe and the Philippines. Of those arriving for work, the largest categories are Skilled Workers (median salary £56,600) and Health and Care workers (median salary £30,900). International students remain a significant component despite the January 2024 dependants ban reducing family-related student migration substantially.
Who is leaving: Emigration has also risen significantly — driven partly by non-EU nationals who arrived during the 2021-2023 peak now leaving after their visas expire, and partly by an increase in British nationals choosing to emigrate.
Why Do They Use "Net Migration"? Is It Because Lots of British People Are Leaving?
This is an excellent question and the honest answer is: yes, partly. Net migration is used because it is the figure that most directly affects the UK's population size and therefore public service demand, housing requirements and labour supply. Adding 813,000 new residents while losing 642,000 adds 171,000 to the population — that net figure is what matters for planning purposes.
But your instinct about British departures is supported by the data. There is net emigration of British citizens, with more leaving than returning. In 2025, this was estimated at 136,000. This means that for every aspect of the net migration figure, the entire positive balance comes from non-British nationals — because British citizens are collectively leaving the UK faster than they are returning.
An estimated 246,000 British nationals left the UK in the year ending December 2025. The emigration of British nationals in the 16 to 24 and 25 to 34 age groups has been relatively stable but the level of negative net migration is most significant in these groups, with around 75,000 more people leaving than arriving in 2025. This gap has grown every year since 2022.
Where are British nationals going? Australia, Canada, Spain, the United States and New Zealand are consistently the top destinations. The ONS May 2026 analysis noted this may reflect young Brits who move abroad for work staying for longer periods, or students who study overseas remaining there for work. There is no single definitive explanation — the data does not capture motivations.
The "brain drain" concern — that Britain is losing its most educated and mobile young people while gaining immigration from countries with different skill profiles — is reflected in the age data. The 25-34 age group shows the largest net outflow among British nationals — the same group at peak earning and taxpaying potential.
What Leaves With Them — Wealth and Skills Outflows
The emigration of British nationals and wealthy foreign residents has two distinct economic consequences: loss of tax base and loss of skills.
Millionaire emigration: As covered on our Property Taxes and Wealth page, 10,800 millionaires left the UK in 2024 — before any wealth tax was introduced. Henley and Partners projected a further 16,500 would leave in 2025. High-net-worth individuals typically pay significantly more than the average in income tax, capital gains tax and VAT — their departure reduces the tax base in ways that are hard to quantify precisely but are structurally significant.
Remittances: A proportion of earnings by foreign nationals working in the UK is sent abroad as remittances — money that is earned in the UK but spent in other countries, reducing its economic multiplier effect domestically. World Bank data suggests UK remittance outflows run at approximately £7-8 billion annually — representing money earned by workers here that leaves the domestic economy.
Skills outflows: When a UK-trained doctor, engineer or teacher emigrates to Australia or Canada, the UK has paid for their education and training but receives none of the subsequent economic return. The NHS specifically faces this dynamic — training costs for NHS clinical staff are substantial, and attrition to better-paid roles abroad (especially in Australia, New Zealand and the US) represents a direct fiscal loss.
Asylum Seekers and Illegal Migration — What It Actually Costs
The cost of the asylum system is one of the most contested numbers in British politics. Different figures are cited depending on what is included, and it is important to distinguish between different categories of cost.
Currently, asylum seekers in the UK receive a package of support which has become a financial burden on the taxpayer, with annual costs of £4 billion across accommodation and support. This is the government's own figure, published July 2026. The National Audit Office figure for 2023-24 was £4.7 billion including £3 billion on hotel accommodation.
In July 2026, the government announced that asylum seekers would in future be required to contribute approximately £10,000 toward the cost of their accommodation — to be paid back before becoming eligible for settlement, or if they return to the UK after leaving. The government stated it had already reduced asylum costs by £1 billion from peak levels.
The per-taxpayer calculation: The National Audit Office total of £4.7 billion divided by approximately 37.4 million UK income taxpayers equals approximately £126 per taxpayer per year. This is the realistic cost of asylum support to each taxpayer — not the much larger figures sometimes cited in political debate.
Small boat crossings: Small boat arrivals in the English Channel remain a significant political issue. The government's immigration enforcement bill — the Immigration and Asylum Bill — represents the most significant reform attempt in a generation, aiming to speed up processing, increase returns and reduce pull factors. The number of small boat arrivals was approximately 30,000 in 2025.
Processing backlog: A major driver of cost is the asylum backlog — applications that take months or years to process, during which applicants are housed at public expense. A faster and more efficient processing system would significantly reduce costs regardless of the overall number of applications. The government's target is to clear the legacy backlog and process new claims within six months.
The Long-Term Picture — What Happens After Year One
Your question is exactly the right one to ask. The headline £4 billion annual asylum cost is a snapshot of what is spent on people currently in the system. It does not capture the cumulative, compounding cost of people who are granted status, bring family members over, and remain in the UK for decades. This section looks at what the data actually shows over the longer term.
What Happens When Asylum Is Granted
In 2025, 42% of asylum applications were granted at initial decision. Once granted refugee status, a person's situation changes fundamentally:
• They gain the right to work, claim benefits and access public funds
• They receive 5 years leave to remain (being reformed to 30 months for new claims from March 2026)
• After 5 years they can apply for indefinite leave to remain (settlement)
• They gain the right to bring immediate family members to join them in the UK through the refugee family reunion route
• After settlement they can apply for British citizenship
Family Reunion — The Multiplier Effect
One of the least-discussed aspects of the asylum system is family reunion. Once someone is granted asylum in the UK, their close family members can apply to join them through the refugee family reunion route. Most asylum seekers are men — 72% of adult applicants from 2015 to 2025. Male refugees who receive asylum often go on to be joined by their female partners through refugee family reunion. From 2015 to 2025, 82% of adults receiving refugee family reunion visas were women.
From 2010 to 2020, the number of people granted asylum-related permission to stay including grants and family reunion visa holders remained relatively stable, ranging between 10,000 and 20,000 annually. But as the number of grants has risen sharply since 2021, so too will the pipeline of family reunion applications in coming years — with a typical lag of 1-3 years between grant and family arrival.
The government suspended the refugee family reunion route for new asylum claims made after 4 September 2025 — one of the most significant policy changes in the 2025 Immigration and Asylum Bill. The number of family reunion visas issued fell sharply in the last quarter of 2025, from 5,300 in Q3 to 2,800. The long-term impact of this suspension is not yet visible in the data.
The Cumulative Fiscal Cost — What the Long-Term Data Shows
Independent analysis by AsylumStats.co.uk — drawing on Migration Observatory and Home Office data — attempted to calculate the cumulative long-term cost of successive years of grants. Using the Migration Observatory's central estimate of £1,700 per year net fiscal cost for non-EEA migrants in a static model, a single cohort of 55,000 grants creates a cumulative fiscal liability of approximately £2.8 billion over a 30-year horizon. Five years of grants at current rates creates a cumulative lifetime fiscal cost of approximately £14 billion.
However, it is important to note that this is one methodology with significant uncertainty. The dynamic model — which accounts for children's future contributions — gives a more favourable picture: the Oxford Economics estimate suggests a £28,000 net benefit per migrant over a full lifetime. The difference between these two estimates — a £2.8bn cost vs a £28,000 benefit per person — illustrates how sensitive the answer is to assumptions about employment rates, wages, benefit usage and children's future contributions.
What is clear from the data is that the fiscal outcome depends overwhelmingly on one factor: whether the person works. A refugee who finds skilled employment within 2-3 years of arrival and works for 30 years makes a net positive fiscal contribution. A refugee who remains on benefits for an extended period does not. Government policy on the right to work — and the speed at which that right is granted — is therefore the single most important lever in determining whether the long-term fiscal impact is positive or negative.
The Right to Work — A Critical Policy Variable
The Home Office does not publish data on the number of asylum seekers granted permission to work or actually in employment. This is a remarkable gap in the data for such a significant fiscal question.
What we know:
• Asylum seekers cannot work for the first 12 months of their claim
• After 12 months they can apply for permission to work — but only in higher-skilled roles (from March 2026)
• In March 2026, the Starmer government abolished the principle that asylum seekers could only work in shortage occupations, allowing employment in any higher skilled job if granted permission to work after 12 months.
• Once granted refugee status they have full right to work
• The employment rate among refugees in the first 3 years after grant is estimated at 40-50% — rising to 65-70% after 5 years (Refugee Council/UNHCR estimates)
Removals — How Many Actually Leave?
The gap between people refused asylum and people actually removed from the UK is one of the most significant — and most politically contentious — numbers in the immigration debate.
Around 50% of refused asylum seekers who applied between 2010 and 2022 had been removed from the UK by the end of 2025. That sounds reasonable — but it means 50% who were refused had NOT been removed, and were still in the UK at the end of 2025.
Around 4% of people who arrived by small boat from 2018 to 2025 were returned from the UK during that period. This is the starkest figure in the data: of all small boat arrivals over seven years, 96% remained in the UK at the end of 2025 — whether through successful asylum claims, ongoing appeals, or inability to remove.
Around 38,000 people were returned from the UK in 2025 across all categories — failed asylum seekers, foreign national offenders, visa overstayers and voluntary returns. There were 9,723 enforced returns recorded in the year ending March 2026 — 13% higher than the previous year.
The low removal rate for small boat arrivals is driven by several factors: high asylum grant rates (42% granted at initial decision), successful appeals by those initially refused, legal challenges to removal, inability to obtain travel documents from countries of origin (particularly Iran, Eritrea, Somalia and Afghanistan), and the sheer operational challenge of removing people who do not cooperate.
Economic Contribution — What the Evidence Shows
The fiscal impact of immigration depends enormously on who is being measured, under what visa route, and over what time period. The evidence is genuinely mixed — different migrant groups have very different fiscal profiles. Presenting only one side of this data would be misleading.
✅ Positive Contributions
Tax revenue: The OBR calculated that in a higher migration scenario, tax receipts would be £18.0 billion higher by the forecast horizon — with £17.5bn from general taxation and £0.5bn from visa fees. Higher migration directly increases the tax base.
Skilled Workers: The Migration Advisory Committee found that Skilled Worker visa holders make a net positive lifetime fiscal contribution. Median earnings of £56,600 mean substantial income tax and National Insurance payments throughout their working lives.
NHS staffing: Around a fifth of NHS staff claimed a nationality other than British. Without immigration, the NHS would face intensified staffing crises and longer waiting lists — with direct costs in terms of worse health outcomes and emergency capacity.
Pre-2012 EEA immigrants: UCL research found that recent EEA immigrants made a net fiscal contribution of £22.1 billion between 2001-2011 — contributing 34% more than they received in public services.
Immigration Health Surcharge: Most visa applicants staying over 6 months pay £1,035 per year for NHS access — an additional charge on top of normal taxation that contributes to NHS funding.
GDP growth: The OBR estimates higher migration adds 0.1% to GDP growth per year — modest but positive.
⚠️ Costs and Pressures
Public services pressure: More people require more schools, hospitals, housing and infrastructure. The OBR notes that without adjusting public service spending to match population growth, higher migration reduces per-capita public service quality.
Care workers and dependants: The MAC found that care workers, Health and Care visa dependants, and partners of British citizens have a net negative lifetime fiscal impact — driven by lower earnings and higher public service use.
Housing demand: Net migration of 171,000 per year adds significant demand to an already constrained housing market. The government's housing target of 370,000 new homes per year is already behind schedule; immigration adds to the demand side of the equation.
Wage effects (contested): Economic theory predicts that large inflows of lower-skilled workers can suppress wages in affected sectors. The evidence is mixed — Bank of England research found modest negative effects on wages in low-skilled sectors during periods of high immigration, while other studies find negligible effects. The scale and direction depend heavily on the skill profile of immigrants and local labour market conditions.
Asylum costs: £4 billion per year in asylum support costs are an ongoing fiscal burden with limited economic offset in the short term, as asylum seekers are not permitted to work during the application process.
The Policy Context — Targets, Reality and Net vs Gross Figures
Every government since 2010 has pledged to reduce net migration to below 100,000 per year. None achieved it. The Conservative governments of 2010-2024 presided over net migration rising from around 250,000 to a record 906,000 — despite the target being a stated manifesto commitment in every general election during that period.
The political use of net migration figures rather than gross immigration figures is sometimes criticised as misleading — because it allows a government to claim progress on immigration when emigration rises, even if arrivals have not fallen. The ONS moved to publishing both gross and net figures partly in response to this criticism.
The current Labour government has not set a specific net migration target, instead committing to ensure migration is "controlled and managed." Net migration in 2025 of 171,000 is substantially below the recent peak, but remains well above the sub-100,000 level that successive governments promised.
The ONS projects that net migration will fall further in 2026 before recovering in later years as some of the temporary factors (visa tightening, departure of those who arrived in the 2021-2023 spike) wash through. The long-run projection in the 2026 ONS population projections assumes net migration rising back toward 230,000 annually by 2028 — still well below the 2023 peak but significantly above historical norms.